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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jack Cahill Steelsmith, Jr. appeals from the district court's orders imposing court 
costs, a fine and driver's license suspension, relinquishing jurisdiction, and denying his 
Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence following his conviction for felony driving while 
intoxicated. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Steelsmith was charged with felony driving under the influence ("OUI") and pled 
guilty to that charge pursuant to an agreement with the state. (R., pp.29-30, 49-56; Tr., 
pp.1-17.) The district court sentenced Steelsmith to a unified term of ten years with two 
years fixed and placed him in the retained jurisdiction (i.e., "rider") program at North 
Idaho Correctional Institution for up to one year. (R., pp.61-64.) The court "defer[red] 
the imposition of costs, fines and other assessments" until the rider review hearing. (R., 
p.62; Tr., p.36, Ls.17-20.) At the end of Steelsmith's rider, NICI staff recommended that 
the court relinquish jurisdiction. (APSI, p.1. 1) The court followed that recommendation 
at the rider review hearing and, after reducing the indeterminate portion of Steelsmith's 
sentence from eight years to five years, ordered his sentence executed. (R., pp.68-72; 
Tr., p.50, Ls.6-14.) At the end of the hearing, the court ordered Steelsmith to pay 
$520.50 in court costs and a $3,000 fine, and suspended his driver's license for three 
years following his release. (R., p.70; Tr., p.50, Ls.15-24.) Steelsmith filed a Rule 35 
1 HAPSI" is the shorthand reference to the Addendum to the Presentence Investigation. 
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motion to reduce his sentence (R., p.7S), which the court denied , pp.36-40). 
Steele a timely appeal. (R., pp.73-76.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Steelsmith states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court erred by imposing various punishments at 
the rider review hearing in violation of jurisdictional limitations and the 
state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished 
jurisdiction by not sufficiently considering the factors which indicated that 
Mr. Steelsmith would be able to succeed in a less structured environment. 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Steelsmith's Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence in light of the new 
evidence he presented. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.?) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Steelsmith failed to show the district court erred in deferring its sentencing 
rulings regarding court costs, a fine, and driver's license suspension until the rider 
review hearing? 
2. Has Steelsmith failed to establish that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of 
sentence? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Steel smith Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Deferring Its Sentencing 
Rulings Regarding Court Costs, A Fine, And Driver's License Suspension Until The 
Rider Review Hearing 
A. Introduction 
Steelsmith argues that the district court erred by deferring its sentencing rulings 
in regard to court costs, a fine, and driver's license suspension until the rider review 
hearing. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-17.) He contends the district court lost jurisdiction after 
the sentencing hearing to make such deferred rulings and that the imposition of 
additional costs placed him in double jeopardy. (Id.) Contrary to Steelsmith's 
arguments, the district court had jurisdiction to defer its rulings until the rider review 
hearing, and those rulings did not place Steelsmith in double jeopardy inasmuch as he 
had not been placed in former jeopardy in regard to them. 
B. Standard Of Review 
'''A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when brought to 
[the appellate courts'] attention and should be addressed prior to considering the merits 
of an appeal.'" State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) 
(quoting H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of Professional Engineers and Land 
Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, 57 (1987». Whether a court has 
jurisdiction is a question of law, given free review. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 483,80 P.3d 
at 1084. Whether an appellant's constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy has 
been violated is a question of law subject to free review. State v. Hansen, 127 Idaho 
675,678,904 P.2d 945, 948 (Ct. App. 1995). 
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C. The District Court Did Not Lose Jurisdiction To Order Court Costs, A Fine, And 
Driver's License Suspension By Deferring Decisions On Those Matters Until The 
Rider Review Hearing 
"[A]bsent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's jurisdiction to 
amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment becomes final, either by 
expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal." State v. 
Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P. 3d 711, 714 (2003). Unless otherwise authorized, a 
district court loses jurisdiction to modify or alter a defendant's sentence once that 
sentence has been imposed and executed. McFraland v. Hunt, 79 Idaho 262,266,313 
P.2d 1076, 1078 (1957) ("The great weight of authority supports the rule that when, 
under a judgment, a valid sentence has been put into execution, the trial court cannot 
amend or modify it ... and that any attempt so to do is of no effect."); State v. Johnson, 
101 Idaho 581, 585, 618 P.2d 759, 763 (1980).2 Steelsmith asserts his sentence was 
2 In Johnson, 101 Idaho at 584-585, 618 P.2d at 762-763, the Idaho Supreme Court 
applied the same principle where the defendant's sentence was increased, explaining: 
Defendant Johnson also contends that the district court erred in 
increasing his sentence to a fixed five year term after initially sentencing 
him to an indeterminate term. Johnson was sentenced to an 
indeterminate term not to exceed three years on April 29, 1977, and was 
given until May 3, 1977, to surrender and commence serving his 
sentence. Johnson did not surrender on May 3, and a bench warrant was 
issued for his arrest. When Johnson was apprehended he was brought 
before the district court and resentenced to a fixed term of five years 
pursuant to I.C. s 19-2513A. Johnson argues that the district court was 
without jurisdiction to enhance his original sentence. 
This Court held in McFarland (sic) v. Hunt, 79 Idaho 262, 313 P.2d 
1076 (1957), that once a valid sentence has been put into execution the 
trial court cannot modify it. See United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 51 
S.Ct. 113, 75 L.Ed. 354 (1931). However, the original sentence imposed 
on Johnson was never put into execution. Following the sentencing, the 
court granted Johnson three days to enable him to attend to his personal 
5 
imposed and executed before his retained jurisdiction period began, and therefore, 
had no jurisdiction to defer its sentencing rulings regarding court costs, a fine, 
driver's license suspension until the rider review hearing. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-
12.) Steelsmith's argument does not hold up under closer examination. 
Under I.C. § 19-2601 (4), a court may retain jurisdiction after a sentence has been 
pronounced. The principal purpose of retained jurisdiction is to evaluate the defendant 
for his or her receptiveness to rehabilitation or probation. State v. Diggie, 140 Idaho 
238, 240, 91 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Ct. App. 2004). During the period of retained 
jurisdiction, the district court shares jurisdiction with the Idaho Board of Correction. 
State v. Williams, 126 Idaho 39, 44, 878 P.2d 213, 218 (Ct. App. 1994) ("The statute 
enables the court and the Board essentially to exercise concurrent authority over the 
offender for a limited period."). The court's jurisdiction lapses at the end of the retained 
jurisdiction period "before which time the court must decide whether to grant probation 
or relinquish jurisdiction and execute the defendant's original sentence." State v. 
Petersen, 149 Idaho 808, 812, 241 P.3d 981, 985 (Ct. App. 2010). "Idaho appellate 
courts have long adhered to the principle that a sentence is imposed when initially 
affairs prior to commencing his sentence. Upon Johnson's failure to 
surrender to commence serving his sentence at the appointed time on 
May 3, 1977, the district court issued a bench warrant for Johnson's 
arrest. Johnson's subsequent arrest in Arizona and extradition to Idaho 
were made pursuant to the bench warrant issued May 5, 1977. Prior to 
his resentencing on July 11, 1977, Johnson had not been placed in the 
custody of the Board of Corrections under his original sentence and 
commitment. Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction to withdraw its 
sentence and impose a new one since the defendant has not commenced 
serving the original sentence. 
(Footnote omitted, emphasis added.) 
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pronounced, even though jurisdiction is retained under I.C. § 19-2601 (4) or the 
sentence is suspended." State v. Alvarado, 132 Idaho 248,249,970 P.2d 516, 517 (Ct. 
App.1998). 
1. The District Court Had Jurisdiction Because It Did Not "Impose" Its 
Sentence Of Court Costs, A Fine, And Driver's License Suspension Prior 
To The Rider Review Hearing 
Steelsmith's insistence that the sentencing measures deferred to, and ordered at 
the rider review hearing increased his sentence is based on the fiction that the court 
imposed a sentence of no court costs, no fine, and no driver's license suspension 
during the initial sentencing hearing. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12 ("the district court 
did not have jurisdiction at the rider review hearing to increase Mr. Steelsmith's 
sentence by imposing new fines, costs, and suspensions").) The record reflects that the 
district court's rulings on courts costs, a fine, and driver's license suspension were not 
imposed, much less ordered into execution, before the rider review hearing. Therefore, 
the district court had jurisdiction to decide those matters. See McFraland, 79 Idaho at 
266, 313 P.2d at 1078; Johnson, 101 Idaho at 585, 618 P.2d at 763. At the end of 
Steelsmith's sentencing hearing, the court said: 
I will defer imposition of court costs other [sic] statutory 
assessments, and I'll defer deciding on a driver's license suspension until I 
see the report from the institution. 
(Tr., p.36, Ls.17-20.) In its Judgment of Conviction and Order Retaining Jurisdiction, 
the court reiterated it would "defer imposition of court costs, fines and other 
assessments, if any, and will take these up at the rider review hearing." (R., p.62.) It is 
apparent from both its verbal and written orders from the sentencing hearing that the 
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district court never imposed or executed any rulings regarding court costs, a fine, or 
driver's license suspension prior to the rider review hearing. To the contrary, the court 
specifically deferred imposing such sentencing measures until the later hearing. 
Steelsmith's argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction to defer imposing 
some of its sentencing rulings until the rider review hearing is based on the misplaced 
notion that differing portions of his sentence could not be imposed at separate times. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.9 ("there is only one point at which the district court may impose 
punishments - the sentencing hearing"), p.11 ("the district court only had jurisdiction to 
impose a sentence on Mr. Steelsmith at his sentencing hearing")); see State v. Ward, 
135 Idaho 68, 71, 14 P.3d 388, 391 (Ct. App. 2000) ("At his sentencing hearing, Ward 
informed the district court that he had discovered that the task force officers had 
videotaped the search of the packages and that he was considering withdrawing his 
guilty plea. The district court proceeded with the hearing but deferred pronouncement 
of the sentence."). A court has "inherent power to regulate its calendar, to efficiently 
manage the cases before it." Department of Labor and Indus. Servo V. East Idaho Mills, 
Inc., 111 Idaho 137, 138-139, 721 P.2d 736, 737-738 (Ct. App. 1986) (internal citations 
omitted). This inherent power must be weighed against the court's duty to "do 
substantial justice." .kl Steelsmith has not presented any viable authority to support his 
argument that the district court acted outside either its jurisdiction or inherent power to 
efficiently manage its cases by deferring its rulings on the three reserved matters (court 
costs, etc.) until the rider review hearing. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.8-12.) The closest 
authority cited is State V. Coassolo, 136, Idaho 138, 142-143, 30 P.3d 293, 297-298 
(2001), quoted for the proposition that "[s]entencing occurs before the period of retained 
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jurisdiction begins, not when jurisdiction is relinquished." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) 
However, Coassolo does not state that a sentencing court cannot expressly defer 
making one or more sentencing rulings until a rider review hearing, where the decision 
on whether to grant probation or relinquish jurisdiction is also made. Even if most 
sentences are fully imposed before a retained jurisdiction period commences, that does 
not mean that district courts may not, in their discretion, defer imposing one or more 
aspects of a sentence after the sentencing hearing. None of the cases cited by 
Steelsmith hold otherwise. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.8-12.) 
2. The District Court Had Jurisdiction Because It Did Not "Execute" Its 
Sentence Of Court Costs, A Fine, And Driver's License Suspension Prior 
To The Rider Review Hearing 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the district court modified or altered Steelsmith's 
previously "imposed" sentence upward at the rider review hearing with regard to court 
costs, a fine, and driver's license suspension (and especially if it did not), the court had 
jurisdiction to do so because the sentence was not also previously "executed." See 
McFraland, 79 Idaho at 266, 313 P.2d at 1078 (a court loses jurisdiction to alter a 
defendant's sentence once that sentence has been imposed and executed); Johnson, 
101 Idaho at 585, 618 P.2d at 763 (sentence increase prior to execution of sentence 
affirmed). There is a difference between when a sentence is imposed and when it is 
executed. As explained in State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 472,474,567 P.2d 17, 19 (1977): 
Appellant then points out the distinction between the imposition of a 
sentence and the execution of a sentence. In Kriebel v. United States, 10 
F.2d 762 (th Cir. 1926), the court stated, 
"The imposition of a sentence means laying the sentence 
upon the defendant, that is, the act of sentencing him; the 
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imposition of a sentence and the execution of it are two 
different things, and the suspension of one is a different 
thing from the suspension of the other." 
Here, the "act of sentencing" occurred on November 18. By 
retaining jurisdiction for 120 days pursuant to I.C. s 19-2601 (4), the court 
then suspended the execution of the already imposed sentence. The 
order of March 17, 1976 thus effectuated the execution of the sentence. 
(Emphasis added.) See State v. Salsgiver, 112 Idaho 933, 934, 736 P.2d 1387, 1388 
(Ct. App. 1987); Bojorquez v. State, 135 Idaho 758, 761, 24 P .3d 706, 709 (Ct. App. 
2000) ("Idaho appellate courts have long adhered to the principle that a sentence is 
imposed when initially pronounced even if its execution is later postponed when the trial 
court suspends the sentence or retains jurisdiction pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601 (4)."). 
Ditmars demonstrates that when a sentence of retained jurisdiction is 
pronounced, such pronouncement constitutes the "imposition" of sentence; however, it 
is the order relinquishing jurisdiction following the period of retained jurisdiction that 
"effectuat[es] the execution" of that sentence. Ditmars, 98 Idaho at 474, 567 P.2d at 19. 
The same is true in Steelsmith's case -- the district court's order relinquishing 
jurisdiction after the rider review hearing effectuated the execution of his sentence. 
Because Steelsmith has failed to show that his sentence was executed prior to when 
the court made its three deferred sentencing rulings at the rider review hearing, he has 
also failed to show the district court lacked jurisdiction to defer making those rulings until 
that hearing. McFraland, 79 Idaho at 266, 313 P.2d at 1078; Johnson, 101 Idaho at 
585,618 P.2d at 763; see State v. McGonigal, 122 Idaho 939,940,842 P.2d 275, 276 
(1992) (trial court had jurisdiction to resentence defendant to a longer sentence after he 
made threats against the judge and a police officer immediately after the initial 
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sentencing hearing because he had not "been placed in the custody of the board of 
correction under the original sentence and commitment"). 
3. Conclusion 
Inasmuch as the district court neither imposed nor executed Steelsmith's 
sentence with regard to court costs, a fine, and driver's license suspension until the 
rider review hearing, it had jurisdiction over Steelsmith to make such rulings. Steelsmith 
has failed to show that the district court lacked jurisdiction to defer its sentencing rulings 
on those matters. 
D. Steelsmith Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, Based 
Upon Double Jeopardy Grounds, In The District Court's Sentencing Orders For 
Court Costs, A Fine, And Driver's License Suspension At The Rider Review 
Hearing 
Steelsmith next contends that the district court's imposition of court costs, a fine, 
and driver's license suspension3 at the rider review hearing violated his constitutional 
protections against double jeopardy and, although not objected to below, constitutes 
fundamental error under State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010). 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-17.) A claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a 
timely objection may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes fundamental error." 
State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). In the 
absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is strictly 
circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being deprived of his or 
3 Steelsmith does not include his driver's license suspension in the headings of his 
double jeopardy issue. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) However, he does allude to 
this driver's license suspension at one point in the body of his argument. (Id., p.14.) 
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her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair in a fair tribunaL" Perry, 150 
Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the 
defendant demonstrates that "one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional 
rights were violated;" (2) the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, 
"without the need for any additional information" including information "as to whether the 
failure to object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must demonstrate that 
the error affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a reasonable 
probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings." kL. at 
226, 245 P.3d at 978. Steelsmith's claim of fundamental error fails on all three 
elements required by Perry. 
The prohibition against double jeopardy encompasses both multiple prosecutions 
and multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 343, 
127 P.3d 954, 959 (2005); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742,756,810 P.2d 680, 694 
(1991); United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993). In regard to double jeopardy 
based on multiple punishments, the Idaho Supreme Court explained in State v. Avelar, 
132 Idaho 775,778,979 P.2d 648,651 (1999): 
The multiple punishment component has been interpreted to provide two 
different protections. First, this component "is designed to ensure that the 
sentencing discretion of courts is confined to the limits established by the 
legislature." [Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984)]. It thus prohibits 
the imposition of a sentence in excess of that authorized by the 
legislature. Second, in U.S. v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 
L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), the United States Supreme Court extended this 
aspect of double jeopardy to prohibit punishments imposed in separate 
proceedings even when authorized by the legislature. 
U[A] criminal defendant attempting to preclude issues from being relitigated in a 
subsequent prosecution must establish that the defendant was placed in 'jeopardy' in 
12 
the earlier proceeding." State v. Gusman, 125 Idaho 805, 808, 874 P.2d 1112, 1115 
(1994); State v. Powell, 120 Idaho 707,708,819 P.2d 561, 562 (1991). In addition to 
showing he was placed in such former (or "original") jeopardy, a defendant must show 
that the former jeopardy has been terminated. The Supreme Court explained in 
Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 3086 (1984), "the 
protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been 
some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy." Accord 
Yeager v. U.S., 557 U.S. 110, 129 S.Ct. 2360, 2369 (2009) (quoting same). Steelsmith 
has failed to point to any event that terminated the original jeopardy of his sentence 
prior to the court's orders for court costs and a fine. 
In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), the Supreme Court 
modified the standard for determining when a sentence has been finalized or terminated 
and jeopardy established. As explained by the federal district court in United States v. 
Groceman, 882 F.Supp. 976, 978 (E.D. Wash. 1995), DiFrancesco ruled that "jeopardy 
does not attach to a sentence until the defendant has a legitimate expectation in the 
finality of his sentence."4 In United States v. Arrellano Rios, 799 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 
4 The full statement in Groceman, 882 F.Supp. at 977-978, is: 
United States v. Von Moos[, 660 F.2d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1981),] says that 
"[j]eopardy attaches in the double punishment context when the defendant 
begins serving the sentence." 660 F.2d at 749. As authority, Von Moos 
cites United States v. Ford[, 632 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1980)]. Ford, in turn, 
relies upon Kennedy v. United States, 330 F.2d 26, 27 (9th Cir. 1964). 
See Ford, 632 F.2d at 1380. What the defendant fails to recognize is that 
Kennedy's statements concerning the Double Jeopardy Clause (e.g., that 
jeopardy attaches when a defendant begins serving his sentence) are no 
longer sound law. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137, 
101 S.Ct. 426, 437, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980); United States v. Andersson, 
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1986) (citations omitted), the Ninth Circuit summarized the holding in DiFrancesco in the 
following manner:5 
813 F.2d 1450, 1461 (9th Cir. 1987). While Kennedy is still relevant to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(c), United States v. Moreno-
Hernandez, 48 F.3d 1112,1115-16 (9th Cir. 1995), the proposition for 
which the defendant cites it has since been rejected by the Supreme 
Court. 
In DiFrancesco, the government appealed a sentence imposed by 
the district court, arguing that the district court had abused its discretion in 
imposing that particular sentence. The Second Circuit dismissed the 
government's appeal on double jeopardy grounds. 449 U.S. at 123, 101 
S.Ct. at 430. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that jeopardy does 
not attach to a sentence until the defendant has a legitimate expectation in 
the finality of his sentence. 449 U.S. at 137-139, 101 S.Ct. at 437-38. 
5 In People v. Williams, 925 N.E.2d 878, 888 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010), the.New York Court 
of Appeals further explained how DiFrancesco modified double jeopardy law: 
In Bozza [v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 167 (1947)], the sentencing 
error was promptly corrected the same day the original sentence was 
declared. 
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently extended this rule beyond 
same-day corrections in United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 101 
S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). There, the Court held that the 
protection against multiple punishments prevents a sentence from being 
increased once the defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of 
the sentence (see id. at 135- 136, 101 S.Ct. 426). Because federal law 
allowed the government to request that the sentence be set aside on 
appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's legitimate 
expectation of finality did not attach "until the [government's] appeal is 
concluded or the time to appeal has expired" (id. at 136, 101 S.Ct. 426). 
Until then, the defendant is on notice that the sentence may be increased 
at any time before those events occur (see id.). 
Similarly, in People ex reI. Pamblanco v. Warden, Rikers Island Correctional Facility, 
868 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008), the court explained: 
There is no bright-line period set by statute or case law that indicates 
when double jeopardy is violated upon resentencing. Instead, the 
Supreme Court introduced the more amorphous concept of "expectation of 
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DiFrancesco held that the constitutional finality and conclusiveness that 
attach to a jury's verdict of acquittal do not attach to a criminal sentence at 
the time it is pronounced. 449 U.S. at 132, 101 S.Ct. at 434. The Court 
also held that jeopardy does not attach at the time a defendant begins 
serving his sentence where the defendant has no reasonable expectation 
of finality in the original sentence. Id. at 139, 101 S.Ct. at 438. The 
defendant in DiFrancesco had no expectation of finality because Congress 
had specifically provided that his sentence was subject to appeal by either 
the defendant or the government. 
(Emphasis added). Here, as in DiFrancesco, Steelsmith had no reasonable expectation 
of finality in the original sentence. The district court specifically informed him at the 
sentencing hearing, and reiterated in its initial sentencing order, that it was deferring its 
sentencing rulings on court costs, a fine, and driver's license suspension until the rider 
review hearing. Steelsmith could not have reasonably believed his sentence relative to 
those issues was in any way determined, much less final. Accordingly, under 
DiFrancesco, former jeopardy did not attach to Steelsmith's sentence in regard to those 
matters before the rider review hearing, and he therefore could not have been in double 
jeopardy at the time of that hearing. 
Steelsmith has failed to demonstrate that the district court's sentences of court 
costs, a fine, and driver's license suspension violated his constitutional right to not be 
placed in double jeopardy. Therefore, Steelsmith has failed to meet the first two 
requirements for demonstrating fundamental error under Perry; that one or more of the 
his unwaived constitutional rights were violated, and that such constitutional error is 
clear or obvious on the record. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Further, 
because Steelsmith has failed to demonstrate a constitutional error based on double 
finality." United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139, 101 S.Ct. 426, 
66 L.Ed. 2d 328 (1980). 
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jeopardy grounds, he necessarily has failed to show that any constitutional error 
"affected the outcome of the trial court proceeding." 19..:. 
II. 
Steelsmith Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction And Denying His Rule 35 Motion For Reduction 
Of Sentence 
A. Introduction 
Steelsmith pled guilty to felony DUI and the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of ten years with two years fixed and retained jurisdiction. (R, pp.29-30; 49-
56, 61-64.) As noted by the court, rather than take advantage of the rider opportunity, 
the Department of Correction concluded Steelsmith was "markedly unsuccessful in [his] 
programming," leading to a recommendation that the district court relinquish jurisdiction. 
(Tr., p.47, Ls.2-16; APSI, p.3.) The court followed that recommendation and 
relinquished jurisdiction, reiterating the Department's conclusions that Steelsmith failed 
to take any responsibility for his behavior, he "remain[ed] at a higher risk for reoffending 
because of [his] unwillingness to admit and accept the fact that [he is] an alcoholic," and 
he failed to take advantage of a number of opportunities to correct his behavior. (Tr., 
p.47, Ls.5-19.) Before executing sentence, the court sua sponte reduced the 
indeterminate portion of Steelsmith's sentence from eight years to five years. (R, p.69.) 
The court thereafter denied Steelsmith's Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. 
(Supp. R, pp.36-40.) 
On appeal, Steelsmith argues that "[t]he district court's decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction was an abuse of discretion in light of the improvements he made during his 
period of retained jurisdiction, in addition to all the other mitigating factors present in his 
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case." (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) He also challenges the denial of his Rule 35 motion, 
contending the district court insufficiently considered new evidence demonstrating his 
amenability to treatment, acceptance into community-based treatment programs, and 
letters from family members who continued to support him. (Id., p.29.) Steelsmith has 
failed to establish an abuse of discretion. A review of the record supports the district 
court's determination, following the period of retained jurisdiction, that Steelsmith was 
not an appropriate candidate for probation, and his new evidence was not sufficient to 
entitle him to a reduction of his sentence under Rule 35. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Moore, 
131 Idaho 814,823,965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 
873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
C. Steelsmith Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
By Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of 
the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. 
See State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711,712,639 P.2d 9,10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 
203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). A court's decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient 
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be 
inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 
584 (Ct. App. 1984). Contrary to Steelsmith's assertions on appeal, a review of the 
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record in this case supports the district court's determination that Steelsmith was not a 
suitable candidate for probation, particularly in light of Steelsmith's less than stellar 
performance during his period of retained jurisdiction. 
Steelsmith is a man with a long history of driving while intoxicated. He was first 
convicted of driving under the influence in 1995, followed by similar convictions in 1997 
(2nd offense), 1999 (amended from felony to misdemeanor), 2003 (commercial vehicle), 
2005 (2nd offense), 2006 (2nd offense), and his current felony DUI conviction in 2010. 
(PSI, pp.3-5.) In addition to now having seven DUI convictions, Steelsmith had DUI 
charges dismissed in 1995 and 1998. (PSI, p.4.) 
Despite his long string of DUI convictions, the district court exercised leniency in 
retaining jurisdiction to afford Steelsmith the opportunity to prove his amenability to 
community supervision. (R., pp.61-63.) Steelsmith failed to take advantage of that 
opportunity, however, as NICI staff recommended jurisdiction be relinquished for the 
following reasons: 
While at North Idaho Correctional Institution, Mr. Steelsmith demonstrated 
himself as an individual who would not take responsibility for his behavior 
after numerous interventions from the NICI staff. It is a serious concern 
that Mr. Steelsmith presented himself as an individual who is unwilling to 
take an honest view of himself, and identify how his continued criminal 
thinking lead [sic] to continued negative consequences. He remains at a 
higher risk for reoffending within the community due to his unwillingness to 
admit and accept his addictive disease and not allowing himself to move 
away from his high denial level. Mr. Steelsmith has had several 
opportunities to correct his behavior through interventions from the TC[6] 
6 "TC" refers to the Therapeutic Community at NICI, which is "a 9 to 12-month program 
that is designed and structured to create an environment for social learning and 
change." (APSI, p.1.) The TC program is a full-time "intensive learning experience in 
which TC participants' behaviors, attitudes, values and emotions are continually 
monitored, [sic] and corrected or reinforced as a part of the daily regime." (Id.) All TC 
participants "attend and complete Cognitive Self-Change, Relapse Prevention, and 
18 
programming and NICI staff. Whenever any TC participants or NICI staff 
attempted to have him look at his negative behavior he would use 
diversion tactics to blame the other person for correcting his behavior. 
Throughout his TC programming he seemed to have a high need to place 
himself in the victim-stance, which became a barrier for him to make the 
changes necessary to create prosocial [sic] thinking and behavior. 
(APSI, pp.3-4.) 
In addition to failing to take responsibility for his behavior, Steelsmith amassed 
26 "pull-ups by his peers in the TC programming" for a variety of negative behaviors, 
including failing to listen or consider input and feedback from other TC participants, 
eating candy in an unauthorized area, being disrespectful to others, and breaking rules 
on the chain of communication. (APSI, p.5.) Steelsmith did complete his Career 
Planning and Portfolio and Education Classes. NICI staff determined, however, that 
those accomplishments did not outweigh Steelsmith's "self-defeating cycle that seems 
to begin with placing himself in the victim-stance and choosing not to take any 
responsibility for his own negative behavior." (APSI, p.7.) In light of this information, 
the district court acted well within its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction. 
Steelsmith argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by failing 
to adequately consider his age (54 at the time of sentencing),7 his brother's in-court 
attend school. In addition, they participate in several meetings and intense drug and 
alcohol treatment that include daily living." (Id.) 
7 Steelsmith correctly notes that the Idaho Court of Appeals indicated in Cook v. State, 
145 Idaho 482,489, 180 P.3d 521,528 (Ct. App. 2008), that increasing age may lessen 
the risk of recidivism. See State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635,639,759 P.2d 926, 930 (Ct. 
App. 1988). However, Steelsmith fails to explain why his age made it more likely he 
would comply with the law while on probation, but conversely, his age made it more 
difficult to comply with the rules of the rider program. (Tr., p.21, Ls.21-23.) Even 
assuming Steelsmith is correct in asserting the rider program is "designed for, and 
populated by, people more than half his age" (Appellant's Brief, p.20), that does not 
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statement that Steelsmith had recently and for the first time admitted being an alcoholic, 
he had temporary housing arranged with the Boise Rescue Mission, he had the support 
of family (including his long-estranged daughter), he had a solid work history, and his 
current conviction was his first felony. (Tr., p.21, Ls.21-23; p.48, Ls.13-16; Appellant's 
Brief, pp.21-25.) Steelsmith's belief that the district court should have assigned more 
weight to some or all of that information does not render the APSl's portrayal of his 
performance during his period of retained jurisdiction inaccurate. 
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably 
determined that Steelsmith was not an appropriate candidate for community 
supervision. This conclusion is supported by Steelsmith's' repetitive history of driving 
while under the influence and the attendant risk he presents to the community, his 
lackluster performance in the rider program, his refusal to accept responsibility for his 
alcohol use, and the recommendation of NICI staff. Given any reasonable view of the 
facts, Steelsmith has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
relinquishing jurisdiction. 
D. Steelsmith Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
By Denying His Rule 35 Motion For Reduction Of His Sentence 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the 
motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 
838, 840 (2007). Steelsmith did not appeal his underlying sentence. Therefore, to 
logically lead to Steelsmith's conclusions that "[t]he age gap would create the difficulty 
to trust his community members" and "his age had a significant impact on his ability to 
complete the program" (id., p.21). 
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prevail on his claim that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 
motion, Steelsmith must "show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or 
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 
35 motion." 1.9.:.; see also State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 442 (2008) 
(absent the presentation of new evidence, an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence). Steelsmith has 
failed to satisfy his burden. 
The new information Steelsmith submitted in support of his Rule 35 motion 
included the following documents, as described by the district court: 
(a) his initial classification score sheet from the Idaho State Correctional 
Institution; (b) a handwritten letter from Steelsmith discussing the various 
classes he has been taking and discussing the positive impact these 
classes have had on him; (c) a progress report for a cognitive self-change 
class, indicating satisfactory attendance and participation and high scores 
in each level; (d) an official transcript from the National Center for 
Construction Education and Research, indicating completion of a basic 
safety course; (e) a certificate of achievement for computer literacy, issued 
by the Robert Janss School; (f) a completed Career Planning and 
Employment Portfolio Checklist indicating Steelsmith has completed 15 
hours of lab work and 6 classroom hours in the listed categories; (g) a 
card showing that he has completed a ten hour Occupational Safety and 
Health Training Course in general industrial safety and health; (h) a letter 
from the Boise Rescue Mission Ministries stating that Steelsmith has been 
accepted as a member of the New Life Recovery Program at the River of 
life Rescue Mission; and (i) two letters of support from family members. 
(Supp. R., p.38 n.1.) 
The district court considered this information and rejected it as a basis for 
reducing Steelsmith's sentence, agreeing with the state's assessment that "Steelsmith 
has not cited a legally sufficient reason for reconsideration and that the imposed 
sentence is still appropriate given Steelsmith's history of D.U.1. offenses." (Supp. R., 
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p.38.) The district court considered ail of the relevant information and reasonably 
determined that Steelsmith failed to show through his new information that his sentence 
was excessive. Steelsmith has failed to establish that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's orders for 
fines and court costs, relinquishing jurisdiction, and denying Steelsmith's Rule 35 
motion for reduction of sentence. 
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